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In Vanuatu, at the beginning of the independence process in the 1970s, 
referring insistently and positively to the concept of kastom in public 
discourses emerged as a notable feature of political rhetoric. For anyone 
engaged in the European style of political debate, referring to kastom 
became a well-established practice verging on obligatory. The symbolic 
efficacy of the word seems to rest in its capacity to summon into view and 
claim a political unity based on belonging to a shared cultural community 
rooted in a timeless incontestable past. However, the growing frequency of 
these rhetorical expressions of kastom is far from timeless. Indeed, one can 
trace historical attempts at politicizing the meaning of this word to make it 
coincide with contemporary ideological and political ideals  (Keesing and 
Tonkinson 1982; Lindstrom and White 1993). Kastom took on a nation-
alist and traditionalist emphasis to epitomize a shared abstract cultural 
value in which the strategic process of nation-building could be anchored. 
When kastom in Vanuatu began to be incorporated in the conception, 
constitution, and practices of the state (Miles 1998), its meaning began 
to encompass both “‘traditional traditions’ and ‘traditionalist traditions’” 
(Otto and Pedersen 2005) and to serve as a cultural as well as a political 
tool (Akin 2004; Babadzan 2004). In the postcolonial intensification of 
“kastomization” in national politics in Vanuatu (Lindstrom 1997)—that 
is, of making the state “kastom friendly” and vice versa—certain under-
lying symbols such as jifs (chiefs), nakamal (traditional meeting places), 
and kava became central to the dynamics playing an active role in the (re)
valuation and transformation of the term. 
According to a state-centered or constitutional version of kastom, tra-
ditional political practices in Vanuatu are legally meant to be personified 
by jifs. Such an official claim has helped to strengthen a popular view of 
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these authority figures as consubstantial with kastom (Bolton 1998). Since 
then, a jif has no longer been just a traditional leader for his community, 
but also “an icon of local tradition and identity” (White and Lindstrom 
1997, 1). The nakamal is thus generally considered as a place where jifs 
exercise their authority and demonstrate their powers. In this dedicated 
space, their ability to maintain peace and unity can be further consolidated 
by the drinking of kava, for instance as a mandatory feature or protocol 
for the closing ceremony of any public gathering. Whether these notions 
have English or vernacular etymologies, their extensive use is consecutive 
to recent semantic standardizations introduced to fit present social and 
political realities both at local and national levels. This “semantic func-
tion” plays a key role in the dynamics of traditionalism. According to 
Georges Balandier, “Political structures resulting from the establishment 
of the ‘new states’ can be interpreted, during the transitional period, only 
in the terms of the old language. These structures can command neither 
immediate comprehension nor immediate support from traditional peas-
antries” (1970, 175). 
However, the seemingly stable or ancient political terms or concepts 
in many Oceanic languages may be sometimes less old than is generally 
thought (Vernaudon, Bambridge, and Sam 2011). Thus, none of the ver-
nacular terminologies related to power and hierarchy in the Austronesian 
languages of Vanuatu precisely expressed the classic sociological defini-
tions of “chief”—the main authority in the monopoly on the legitimate 
use of violence in traditional social orders: “There are no chiefs in Ni- 
Vanuatu custom, except in a few, specific areas. There are only big men 
and the English word ‘chief’ has had to be incorporated into many Ni-
Vanuatu languages to refer to the most influential man in a village” (Mac-
Clancy 1980, 77). 
This article concentrates on several aspects of the ongoing transforma-
tion of traditional leadership in postcolonial Vanuatu. It provides updates 
on recent changes in the political role of contemporary “chiefs” and other 
leaders and in their relations with state bureaucracies. Finally, it examines 
these dynamics in the specific context of Tannese society, in the south of 
the archipelago. Although Tanna is currently seen by many Ni-Vanuatu 
as still deeply respectful of kastom rules in everyday life, its inhabitants 
have always experimented a great deal in chiefly matters. To put it in 
another way, indigenous traditions relating to the exercise of power and to 
expressions of authority have never been static and are among those that 
have significantly changed. Marshall Sahlins, for instance, has identified 
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traditional leaders in the Pacific with the most flexible and durable part of 
tradition, placing them at the vanguard of the “indigenization of moder-
nity” process. The “most powerful chiefs” and the “biggest big men,” he 
noted, all came into existence after early European presence, not before 
(Sahlins 1992, 17).1 More recently, archaeological findings have even 
suggested that big men in Melanesia are a creation entirely due to post–
Western contact influences and that they were born out of the decline of 
formerly more powerful authority figures who ruled over less egalitar-
ian societies (Spriggs 2008; see also Sand 2002). Bigmanship would thus 
appear to have been an indigenous politico-economic response to drastic 
social changes, characterized by huge demographic collapse and the con-
sequences of colonial pacification.
Insofar as traditional political leaders are commonly considered to be 
embodiments of kastom, this focuses on their propensity for mediating 
and, at times, transforming the collective relationship to tradition, while 
also transforming their own role. If the loss of respect for chiefs is fre-
quently ranked as the main symptom of the decline of kastom, the non-
respectful attitudes of these leaders toward the very source of their legiti-
macy is seen as its foremost cause. However, Christianization, colonial 
control, community development, national unity, and democratization—
all successive outside sources of interference with indigenous systems of 
authority—have usually been concerned more with the evolving role of 
chiefs than with other changing aspects of local kastom. The informa-
tive case of Tanna’s contemporary “chiefs” supports the argument that 
although they have emerged from the island’s changing political landscape 
through local agency, they have at the same time been dealing with a host 
of miscellaneous outsiders and foreign resources (Guiart 1956; Adams 
1984; Bonnemaison 1987). The way they are simultaneously framed by 
the local and the global is observed here through the modernization of 
traditional processes in which they are increasingly involved (Lindstrom 
1990; Bolton 1998). 
A short overview of the historical emergence and national cultural con-
structions of chiefs in Vanuatu should help us to examine how the dialec-
tic of simultaneously politicizing and depoliticizing chiefs has been trans-
ferred by the central state to rural contexts. Identifying kastom jifs—that 
is, including or excluding different sorts of leaders from this category—has 
remained a widespread practice. The use, or sometimes abuse, of kastom 
titles for personal interest fuels recurrent disputes over cultural property 
and cultural appropriation. But on the other hand, exploiting kastom titles 
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for nontraditional purposes offers new possibilities for a better state and 
wider global connections, even with outsiders interfering in island politics. 
Among different aspects of selecting chiefs, special attention is given in 
this article to procedures that follow an entirely non-customary process, 
like the creation of councils, elections, or dubious co-options. Here again 
Tanna provides an interesting case study of the repeated attempts that 
have been made by rival chiefly institutions to codify kastom, while at 
the same time ensuring the conversion of their ancient privileges into new 
bureaucratic attributions. 
In their new role as tenured “masters of tradition,” customary chiefs 
today in Tanna, like elsewhere in Vanuatu (Rodman 1987), have to man-
age ever-increasing connections with faraway actors and distant places. 
Over the last twenty years, the political history of Tanna has provided 
many examples of how traditional leaders have treated kastom as a politi-
cal and economic resource on a global scale, accepting a strategy that is 
not without risk for the stability of their own local communities. 
Chiefs, kastom Titles, and State Structures in Vanuatu 
The Condominium of the New Hebrides, first set up in 1906, was mocked 
as a “pandemonium” due to its inefficient bureaucracy and administrative 
gridlock. It was a double-headed colonial territory where the French and 
British, despite their historical “entente cordiale” declaration, constantly 
agreed to disagree. They also diverged in their respective views of what 
chiefs, as an institution, were or should become. Indeed, given this con-
text, it is not easy to clearly define whether this archipelago should be 
considered as having been governed under direct or indirect rule. The Ni-
Vanuatu, as noncitizens without any civic rights, remained under the rule 
of custom or the Church during most of the colonial period, but not neces-
sarily under the law of “traditional chiefs” (Hours 1978). In comparison 
to priests, colonial officers, or indigenous assessors, village chiefs appear 
to have had little effective power and may have been merely the brokers of 
colonial times, “individuals selected to represent the community in non-
traditional contexts” (Bolton 1998, 185).
This situation definitively changed in 1975, when the pro-independence 
New Hebrides National Party won the first general election for a Repre-
sentative Assembly. But its majority could have been endangered by the 
complementary election to this assembly of four chiefs by an electoral col-
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lege composed of their fellow “customary chiefs” from the four adminis-
trative districts. This strategy was not without consequences: “The Condo-
minium wished to include kastom jifs in the Representative Assembly but 
the variability of customs from island to island, plus the decay or change 
in traditional political organization in many areas made the definition of 
who was, or was not, a kastom jif highly problematic” (MacClancy 1988, 
104). From September 1975 to June 1976, the election of these chiefs was 
at the center of New Hebrides political life: “The two governments, . . .
each with their own vision of custom, interfered a lot with the election 
without any legitimacy. Elected members were refused by District Agents 
for a lack of valid customary genealogy or on other such pretexts” (Hours 
1978, 18). But after this initial foreign intervention in the process of select-
ing chiefs, the politicization of kastom took on its full dimension with the 
creation of a special category of selected individuals meant to embody it. 
Formalizing jifs as a kastom elite gave them an importance beyond the 
local level and created a potential social ranking that had not existed for-
merly: “This new role for chiefs as representing kastom significantly, and 
subtly, underlines the identification of chiefs as traditional leaders—not as 
a matter of European perception, but of local practice. As a consequence, 
the relationship of chiefs to the traditional sources of authority they were 
now to represent became much more crucial and was disputed at a local 
level” (Bolton 1998, 185–186).
Henceforth, the legitimacy of chiefs and the institutional role they 
would or would not have to play in relation to the sovereign state and the 
nation-building process produced heated debates about “what was true 
kastom and what was gammon [ie, nonsense]” (MacClancy 1980, 78). To 
be accused of being a “politikol jif ” became a reversible criticism. It was a 
derogatory argument made use of by both pro-nationalist Christian chiefs 
and anti–state control traditionalist chiefs. Many criticized each other in 
order to claim and manipulate kastom in their own interest instead of 
that of the people they were supposed to represent. In certain circum-
stances, these antagonisms have persisted: “Today’s kastom jifs, although 
undoubtedly kastom, are not simply customary” (Lindstrom 1997, 212). 
The quest to identify jifs strictly legitimated by kastom continues. Most 
Ni-Vanuatu at least agree that some kastom jifs appear less customary 
than others; many could also approve the definition of the three categories 
of chiefs given by Jean-Marie Léyé, the first president of the Republic of 
Vanuatu: 
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[“Political chiefs”] had achieved positions of leadership through their activity 
in politics. [“Missionary chiefs”] had been risen to the position of chiefs by the 
missionaries. [The “Land chiefs”] were the genuine custom chiefs. (Constitu-
tional Committee 2009, 140) 
But even for leaders of the third category, ambiguities remain concern-
ing the relations of chiefs to the state. As middlemen, they serve the state 
and are served by it, but they can also tread on it as they tread on and 
betray their own people when they fail to respect the spirit of kastom in 
their deeds (Lindstrom 1997). This is one of the reasons why, even when 
chiefs are considered in a nationalist perspective as a powerful symbol of 
sovereignty, they can represent neither the whole of customary hierarchy 
nor the whole of kastom as a foundation of national identity: “Chiefs are 
but one fiber of the cloth of kastom” (Miles 1993, 37). But chiefly titles 
are still needed for politicians and charismatic leaders to gain power. Post-
colonial leaders have played an eminent role in turning local customary 
titles into state kastom protocol (see Tabani 2002).
But showing empathy for kastom by claiming a customary name or title, 
or both, would henceforth seem even more futile when it concerned natu-
ralized citizens or even foreigners trying to achieve personal political or 
business objectives. The media frequently mention cases of such foreigners 
having locally received a chiefly title. Ofer Shagan, an Israeli citizen and 
renowned art dealer in Tokyo who had bought land in Vanuatu for tour-
ism developments, was adopted in Tautu (Malekula), where he received 
from the local community the chiefly title Apia Nemt Enuanu (the Eyes of 
the Chiefs) (Japan Times, 18 Dec 2005). His customary appointment was 
only contested on the grounds that he also claimed in the international 
press that he was henceforth “king of Malekula” (Vanuatu Daily Post, 
17 March 2006). Dominique Dinh, a local businessman and son of an 
indentured laborer, received the chiefly names Tamakaro and Lapangtaua 
after having been adopted both in Pango and Tanna. He then created the 
“Chiefs’ Movement of Vanuatu” and was appointed “chief of chiefs.” His 
profile is very similar to that of his brother, the very wealthy entrepreneur 
Gilbert Dinh Van Than, the “largest private employer in Vanuatu and, 
many say, the most politically influential and controversial citizen” (Cro-
combe 2007, 76). Last but not least, their sister Thi Tam Goiset later also 
became involved in customary politics. With a name bestowed in 2008 
in Vanafo (Santo)—Te Moli Venaos Mol Saken—and two more in 2009 
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in Tanna—Nanumian and Swerenao—she was proclaimed “paramount 
chief” of two former secessionist indigenous movements, Nagriamel and 
John Frum, a position intended to give her more credit when in 2011 the 
Vanuatu government appointed her roving ambassador to Russia.
This matter of kastom jif titles held by outsiders would appear to be 
one of the least traditional practices. Nevertheless, it has so far engen-
dered fewer disturbances at the grassroots level than the contamination 
of local community leaders by national politics. Through the institution-
alization of neotraditional authorities and the bureaucratic attributions 
conferred on them, some of these leaders turned into kastom-ideology 
activists and tried to take advantage of their newly fashioned “state jif ” 
role (Lindstrom 1997). This radical innovation came into being with the 
creation of the National Council of Chiefs, also called the Malvatumauri, 
after independence. In 1975, the French administration tried to oppose the 
election of two pro-independence leaders among the four custom chiefs 
meant to join the first Representative Assembly. The pro-French party 
Union des Communautés des Nouvelles-Hébrides recommended adding 
five more seats in the assembly for chiefly representatives. Finally, at the 
end of June 1976, agreement was achieved that twenty more chiefs (five 
from each district) would be independently elected, in addition to the vote 
by universal suffrage, to form a separate “Council of Chiefs.” The elec-
tion of 14 pro-independence chiefs out of a total of 24 definitively over-
came pro-French attempts to use traditionalist forces in order to challenge 
the growing majority of nationalist supporters. Among those who had 
been elected, some were “traditional custom chiefs wearing customary 
dress who were very often skeptical of politics, or disappointed with it, as 
well as politically involved men such as priests or non-traditional leaders” 
(Hours 1978, 19). The legitimacy of the Malvatumauri was confirmed at 
independence by the first elected government. A National Day of Chiefs, 
every 5th of May, was validated by the constitution, but any claim to 
make the Malvatumauri play the role of an upper legislative chamber or 
Senate was rejected.
The new sovereign state was thus successful in neutralizing this institu-
tion’s subversive potential and, up until now, its role has remained mostly 
consultative and symbolic. Chiefs are regularly summoned by politicians 
who, in order to endorse a series of conservative measures, try to use them 
in the guise of serving a traditionalist agenda. Placed under the legisla-
tive responsibility of the Vanuatu Parliament, the capacities of the Malva-
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tumauri have been restricted to simply advising and making superficial 
codifications concerning general principles supposed to regulate the realm 
of kastom. 
At a national level, the Malvatumauri has never attempted to define 
precisely who in Vanuatu can legitimately claim to be a kastom jif.2 This 
institutional task has been relegated to the local politics of each island 
community. I therefore pursue this survey of non-customary aspects of 
chiefly claims and positions by examining the process of codification of 
kastom at an island level, in a rural context. The case of the island of 
Tanna provides a good example of the local priority given to the defini-
tion of titles, statuses, and capacities that justify the claim to hold a chiefly 
position and to become part of local councils with other representatives 
of the same rank. 
Precolonial Authorities in Tanna
Since the Tannese encounter with Captain James Cook in 1774, and until 
the end of the colonial period, all the ethnographic records converge 
toward a shared statement of fact: “chief” figures did not exist as such 
in late precolonial Tannese society. In their observations, early European 
visitors, missionaries, and anthropologists all expressed surprise at this 
absence. According to reports of the first outsider observers in the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries, the Tannese may have known of the 
existence of chiefs, given that many of them appeared to hold exclusive 
hereditary titles. However, none of these titleholders was able to show any 
authority over other men. No “real” leader was in command: “No Tha-
kombau, Pomare, Kamehameha there” (Turner 1861, 84). Ron Adams 
provided a short compilation of Europeans’ desperate quest to find Pacific 
high chiefs, ariki, or kings in Tanna:
Cook noted that, [the Tannese who] “have been pointed out to us by that 
[chief] title . . . seemed to have very little authority over the rest of the people.” 
John Reinhold Forster, naturalist on board . . . wrote that chiefs of Tanna were 
not generally distinguishable from their subjects “by rank or authority, and 
seem to enjoy only an hereditary title.” [As stated by the missionary George 
Turner, the chief’s] authority did not extend beyond “a gunshot from his dwell-
ing.” . . . [Missionary John G] Paton gave up any attempt at consistency, claim-
ing that chiefs on Tanna have really no power. . . . [Missionary William Watt’s] 
wife had noted “chieftainship may be said to consist only in name. In a village 
of eight or nine men, six will claim to be chiefs.” (Adams 1984, 14–15) 
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Clarence B Humphreys speculated that the Tannese may have had power-
ful “suzerain chiefs” in former times but that due to foreign influence these 
had suffered a considerable loss of power; in some parts of the island, he 
surmised, this break with precolonial forms of authority may have been 
so deep that people completely forgot them (1926). This absence may 
have undermined foreigners’ usual strategies of co-opting local authority 
figures in order to establish colonial rule over indigenous subjects.
At the end of the nineteenth century, Tanna was placed under an oppres-
sive theocratic missionary regime. The then so-called Tanna law was sup-
ported by converted leaders who, in exchange for their support of the 
radically anti-kastom Presbyterian policy—a programmed cultural tabula 
rasa—were considered paramount “Christian chiefs” by the mission. Until 
the establishment of the condominium, these converted leaders worked to 
repress all symbols of former attributes of hierarchy and traditional power 
still held by opposing pagan groups. The new hierarchy imposed by the 
mission was confirmed in the 1910s with the establishment of an admin-
istrative hierarchy based on indigenous district assessors under the rule of 
district agents. The imposition of the condominium rule created a great 
deal of anarchy, while reducing the political landscape to single village 
chiefs without any prerogative other than that of simply being “headmen” 
of small residential groups. To prevent unrest at the island level, colonial 
district agents assumed sole control of coercive legal measures. Indirect 
rule was hence quite limited. The formalization of these new authority fig-
ures was accompanied by a standardization of imported titles. Christian 
chiefs were recruited by the missionaries among elders, pastors, or teach-
ers; administrative village chiefs, called “boss” in Bislama, were employed 
locally as middlemen, along with indigenous district assessors appointed 
by French and British colonial officers, and placed under their strict com-
mand. Some of these new leaders held simultaneously the attributes of 
both Christian and administrative chiefs, while sometimes also claiming 
distinguished, traditionally inherited titles. They are sometimes remem-
bered by older informants as “big jifs.” Despite repeated colonial attempts 
at “chieftainization” of Tannese society, Europeans still faced the great-
est difficulties in understanding totally different cultural conceptions of 
power and hierarchy.
Indeed, after one hundred fifty years of cultural changes, Jean Guiart’s 
field research revealed that the traditional system of acknowledging dig-
nitaries and inheriting special titles and names was not dead at all, even 
if its coercive efficiency had become largely subaltern to colonial authori-
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ties (1956). He described the Tannese society as one of the most atomis-
tic of Pacific Island cultures. In the 1950s, half the members of the male 
population held a hierarchical position or some privilege legitimated by a 
complex semi-hereditary titles system. “Some villages or territorial groups 
have up to twelve chiefs; others have none. At first glance, one may have 
doubts about the classic description of a Melanesian village chief applying 
here. . . . [There’s] a practical impossibility of defining allegiances. It is not 
known who obeys whom” (Guiart 1956, 9). A consequence  arising from 
this situation was the “generalization of a science of protocol that would 
make the herald of a Polynesian court jealous” (Guiart 1956, 107). For a 
tribal society, Guiart argued, the social organization in Tanna offered the 
paradoxical image of a “reign of individualism” (1956, 115). Whenever 
their power was actively contested, chiefs were finally created by the com-
bined efforts of missionary and colonial authorities. They coexisted, in 
a flexible, contextual manner, with former traditional authorities (agrar-
ian specialists, ritual experts, and other owners of renowned titles); new 
prophetic indigenous leaders; and imported bureaucratic and business 
authorities. But it was only with the independence of Vanuatu that this 
process of chief making became really intensive and more efficient. As 
Julia Wilkinson noted, still at the end of the 1970s in Tanna: “The con-
cept of kastom jif was ambiguous and hard to understand. People did 
not know whether it meant someone who was traditionally a chief as on 
Tanna, or simply someone who could represent kastom since he still lived 
in a traditional way and could make sure that new legislation and mod-
ernization did not destroy kastom” (1979, 142). 
kastom Titles with Virtual Powers
The ancient titles system has been somewhat confused by early foreign 
observers of power relations in Tanna. An incredible multiplicity and 
diversity of titles hardly seems to fit with a reliable political organiza-
tion. No two, even when similar, can ever be considered equivalent. Each 
one is specific and has its own local and particular traditional legitimacy. 
Although men need titles to maintain inherited privileges or gain hierar-
chical influence, these remain insufficient. Speaking about titles (a word 
that does not exist in any of the Tannese languages—such as Kwamera, 
Whitesands, Southwest Tanna, Lenakel, North Tanna) is itself a way of 
rationalizing the exercise of power. First and foremost, titles are related to 
names. Every lineage-like residential group (nemwipwi) possesses a stock 
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of ancestral names or “name sets,” which are individually passed down 
from generation to generation through inheritance or adoption. A com-
plete set of names corresponds to all the land that can be claimed by the 
social group to which names and land belongs. Some holders of the pres-
tigious names part of this stock are chosen within the nemwipwi (some-
times among adopted members) for their personal capacities as much as 
in accordance with their inherited rights. They can thus benefit from dif-
ferent kinds of contextual privileges at different ceremonial occasions or 
ritual exchanges. But such temporary and contextual hierarchical distinc-
tions cannot be interpreted in terms of strictly secular power. Names, to be 
powerful, must be connected to various supernatural capacities related to 
the use of all sorts of ancestral power stones (nukwei nari) that control the 
weather, cultigens, pigs’ fertility, and the like (figure 1). The names of these 
stones themselves belong to the exclusive corpus of a nemwipwi. More 
precisely, a nemwipwi’s stock of names comes from these ancestral power 
stones, which represent the original ancestors of each group.
For early missionaries, as well as later for colonial district agents, this 
names-titles-stones-ancestors system was not considered appropriate for 
political use. Instead, they engaged in an active struggle against the use of 
nukwei nari, especially those fearsome sorcery stones that can kill victims 
(nukwei nahak). A consequence of this rejection was that all the other 
interconnected aspects of names, stones, and titles were also done away 
with or greatly displaced. Spiritual powers related to the pagan “Time of 
Darkness” were not considered a manipulable authority, useful in tak-
ing advantage of the Tannese. Nahak stones and the men associated with 
them were immediately identified as priority targets for elimination:
The real gods at Tanna may be said to be the disease-makers. It is surprising 
how these men are dreaded, and how firm the belief is that they have in their 
hands the power of life and death. There are rain-makers and thunder-makers, 
and fly and mosquito-makers, and a host of other “sacred men,” but the dis-
ease-makers are the most dreaded. (Turner 1861, 89) 
It was not until the 1950s that the island had started to recover from sev-
eral decades of severe depopulation, especially from introduced diseases 
(Guiart 1956, 119). A direct consequence of this demographic upsurge 
was the widely shared desire to revive titles among groups that no longer 
had enough men alive to hold them. In these circumstances, many titles 
were transferred between groups. Many power stones were also destroyed 
by Christian converts and the use of nahak stones was abolished. 
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Nevertheless, Guiart succeeded in providing a large list of ritual privi-
leges and ceremonial exchange prerogatives associated with the possession 
of names, titles, and stones (1956). He also described more precisely how, 
in that system, certain titles can correspond to specific statuses that enable 
their holders to play a dominant role in exclusive contexts. Iermenu and 
ieni neteta are specific statuses or positions that can facilitate the expres-
sion of concrete and sometimes enduring leadership.3 These are the only 
titles to which the Tannese are referring when they use the word jif today. 
In the ritual context of the spectacular nakwiari ceremonies, the ier-
menu are responsible for the exchanging of hundreds of pigs and as many 
huge kava roots.4 On this occasion, they also publicly exhibit their ritual 
status by demonstrating their exclusive rights to hold the kwerrya, a giant 
bamboo pole covered with painted feathers (figure 2). Men of different 
allied groups, who come to help the iermenu in this honorific task, thus 
show their commitment to supporting this ritual dignitary in his ceremo-
nial responsibilities and to protecting him in the event of war. This form 
Figure 2 Iermenu and his followers carrying a kwerrya pole for a  nakwiari 
 ceremony in Mwaterkerek, Tanna, September 2010. © Philippe Métois; 
 reproduced with permission. 
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of allegiance is given by men of several nemwipwi belonging to the same 
mythical and territorial unit called a neteta or canoe and linked together 
through the nakwiari network. Tanna has over a hundred neteta (some-
times imperfectly translated as “tribes”) and each one can include sev-
eral ieni neteta dignitaries (also spelled ieni entete). These “masters” or 
“spokes men” of the “canoe” (Guiart 1956, 88) are guarantors of peace 
and war within the neteta, a mythological territory deeply rooted in a living 
“terroir” where ancestors were part of the social and natural landscape. 
Dignitaries or notables who could claim the titles of iermenu or ieni 
neteta in precolonial times were certainly well positioned to gain the pres-
tige of a “big man” figure (nakur asori or nema asori). However, it may 
have been possible to acquire that status without any titles, through an 
ability to influence group decisions using personal knowledge (Lindstrom 
1981). Conversely, to be renowned as a big man offers the possibility, 
through genealogical manipulations, of gaining a title: “Many local big 
men become ierumanu or ieni entete after they are first big men” (Lind-
strom 1981, 69). During colonial rule, acquiring big man status was an 
advantage for being appointed a Christian chief by the missions or an 
assessor by district agents. But along with such developments, in the wake 
of the rise of the prophetic John Frum movement, different new syncre-
tistic dignitary statuses appeared: “prophet,” “spokesman,” “captain,” 
“police,” or “army” (Tabani 2008).
With the country’s approaching independence, the politicization of kas-
tom became particularly virulent. Local movements and groups upgraded 
into political parties (John Frum, Kapiel, Fokona) that more or less 
accepted the principle of universal suffrage and whose main ideological 
rhetoric was to oppose kastom to politik. Assessors’ positions or Christian 
chiefs’ appointments started to become a burden for many big men or title-
holders who could be accused of standing as “giaman [false] jifs” because 
of their colonial affiliation. On Tanna, the general political antagonisms 
and tensions between nationalist followers and traditionalist forces gradu-
ally increased until the secession attempt organized in 1980 by traditional-
ist groups opposed to an independence governed by nationalist Christian 
groups. The fear of seeing these struggles develop into an open civil war 
brought the traditional war leaders back to the forefront. Peaceful times, 
which are more propitious to the exercise of the iermenu’s responsibili-
ties in ceremonial exchanges, came to a temporary end. The “spokesmen 
of the canoe” dignitaries were better armed to face the new contentious 
challenge created by accession to independence. As we see in the next sec-
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tion, on Tanna the bureaucratization of chiefs through repeated attempts 
at codifying kastom favored the rise and prestige of the ieni neteta, who 
traditionally hold the role of talking chiefs in the context of a sovereign 
state in need of local mediators to establish its new legitimacy. 
Bureaucratization of Chiefs and Codification  
of kastom in Tanna
After World War II, “native courts,” first appointed by the condominium 
in 1912, started to lose their efficiency in maintaining law and order. Since 
the 1940s, colonial district agents assisted by their indigenous district 
assessors had to face the John Frum rebellion. While encouraging a gener-
alized return to kastom and traditional forms of authority, this movement 
brought to an end the unchallenged hegemony of Christian chiefs and put 
a stop to the blind repression by church and colonial authorities of pagan 
traditions and John Frum beliefs. Condominium authorities encouraged, 
in the 1950s, the establishment of indigenous “local councils,” with offi-
cial authority in most civil matters. However, until independence, the 
French and British never succeeded in empowering these councils, since 
nobody could agree on the designation of indigenous representatives: 
“The lack of any clearly defined system of chieftainship on the principal 
island of Tanna was the major obstacle to the rapid establishment of the 
chiefly Electoral College [body of electors for the Representative Assem-
bly]” (Woodward 2014, 52).
In 1968, Iolu Abil a young educated Tannese, who later would become 
president of the Republic of Vanuatu, tried to launch a project to set up 
a local consultative council in order to federate the island’s population. 
Abil gave his proposed council the name “Iani Niko” (in Lenakel lan-
guage: Spokesman of the Canoe). Its purpose was to act as a supra-local 
island forum, enabling a collectively instituted indigenous opinion to be 
given on any political or economic developments. This consultative coun-
cil could also have provided a future democratic foundation on which to 
base political emancipation from the colonial system. But what could have 
become a positive contribution to the modern political history of the Tan-
nese led to the opposite. Although claiming that the Iani Niko council was 
a “customary parliament,” Abil rapidly generated a great deal of hostility 
toward his project among traditionalist dignitaries. The whole operation 
was considered by its opponents as a way to politicize Tannese kastom for 
nationalist claims and search for personal power: “The Iani Niko [coun-
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cil] became a crucible in which all [the former colonial] political and reli-
gious divisions were renewed” (Bonnemaison 1987, 442).
The Iani Niko council also became a subject of division between British 
and French authorities. The first supported the unifying intentions of its 
project, while the second stressed its divisive aspects. As a result, the Iani 
Niko council received no official recognition. A new attempt on behalf of 
this council to be acknowledged as a legal institution was launched a cou-
ple of years later. After it had changed its name to Nikoletan (“The Land 
Canoe”) in 1973, a new demand to be allowed to play the role of a rep-
resentative political structure was rejected for the same reasons as before. 
The British district agent in Tanna heavily criticized his French colleague, 
accusing him of “discouraging any local political initiative and support-
ing different movements which have a strong tendency to be influenced 
by colonialist and reactionary forces”; in his answer, the French district 
agent emphasized that he refused to grant any power to a minority group 
formed by a young anglophone Christian elite and clearly calling for the 
country’s urgent independence (Bonnemaison 1987, 443).
The lack of a supra-local structure among the Tannese for discussing 
the future of their island and sovereign country led both francophone-
traditionalist and anglophone-nationalist groups toward escalating ten-
sions. This situation ended with the failure of the francophone groups and 
parties, both locally and nationally, to win the 1979 elections for the Con-
stituent Assembly. In June 1980, one month before the proclamation of 
the independence of Vanuatu, they tried to launch a rebellion against the 
nationalists but definitively lost the battle when their leader Alexis Yolou 
was killed. Finally, the new government of Vanuatu, formed by Anglo-
phones (mostly clergymen of the Presbyterian Church) and the National 
Council of Chiefs (the Malvatumauri) rapidly granted official legitimacy 
to the Nikoletan (figure 3).
In 1983, the Malvatumauri published its first “traditional cultural pol-
icy” draft or kastom polisi (Lindstrom and White 1994). Its main purposes 
were to protect existing kastom in rural places and to promote a national 
synthesis of local, codified traditions. However, as mentioned earlier, this 
text provides no harmonization of chiefly status due to an obvious inca-
pacity to define or codify kastom at a national level. Amid the differ-
ent topics addressed by the Malvatumauri’s policy, article 20 (devoted to 
the “chiefs’ organization in Vanuatu”) is obviously the most minimalist: 
“Sec.1: Plans for the work of chiefs in Vanuatu must continue and develop 
further in the future. Sec.2: There must be a National Council of Chiefs in 
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Vanuatu and island councils of chiefs, and area councils of chiefs, and vil-
lage councils of chiefs in order to promote custom chiefs in the Republic of 
Vanuatu” (quoted in Lindstrom and White 1994, 242). Article 29, section 
1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu only adds more impreci-
sion about chiefly representatives: “The National Council of Chiefs shall 
be composed of custom chiefs elected by their peers sitting in District 
Councils of Chiefs” (Government of the Republic of Vanuatu 1980). 
Thus, the business of codifying kastom was delegated to the island or 
district council level. In Tanna, the Nikoletan council swiftly began the 
task with considerable enthusiasm. Some of its members formed a commit-
tee to work on a “Tanna island kastom” project. A forty-five-page booklet 
written in Bislama was typed and, in 1985, officially declared by this neo-
customary body to be “the true kastom law of Tanna” (D’Arcy 1994, 6). 
This document is remarkable in many of its contradictory aspects, but its 
main interest lies in how it tries to codify selected, nondiversified elements 
of local customs by focusing obsessively on the power of chiefs. According 
to its subtitle, “true kastom” on the island is the “Law of Tanna Chiefs.” 
Figure 3 Logo and motto of the Nikoletan council of iani, July 2011. © Marc 
Tabani.
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Those on the committee for this project, like all other members of the 
Nikoletan, were supposed to have acquired or be able to lay claim to a iani 
niko title. Therefore, it is not surprising that, in their standardization of 
chiefly figures, they proclaimed themselves to be those most eligible to be 
in charge of kastom governance matters. In fact, two types of chiefs were 
put forward: “Art.2 Law concerning Chiefs of Tanna: In the beginning, 
iani and iaramara both came out of the stone. Iani is the chief of every-
thing, in the name of iaramara” (D’Arcy 1994, 11).
As iani are responsible for everyone who belongs to the kastom of Tanna 
and are the sole dignitaries authorized to give orders, their “voice is holy 
and must be respected and honored” (D’Arcy 1994, 11). But otherwise, 
iaramara are mostly mentioned for their special duties and responsibili-
ties regarding the ritual organization of the nikouiar ceremony. The main 
chiefly role is definitively occupied by the iani titleholders. To secure their 
position, they themselves decided that 
custom law was reintroduced to forbid men from talking in the meetings. The 
right to talk in meetings belongs to the chiefs. Other people who are forbidden 
to talk in meetings are: manamana (supporters of the chiefs), all iaramara (high 
Figure 4 Yeni (or iani) present their duties as chiefs at a workshop on kastom 
governance in Lenakel, Tanna, July 2011. © Marc Tabani.
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chiefs), and all tupunis (special people who work with stones [agrarian magi-
cians], etc), none of these people have the right to talk in the meeting where 
chiefs only have the right to talk. (D’Arcy 1994, 12) 
A marked intention of the writers of this code is to impose a strong 
hierarchy, with iani and iaramara at the top of the ladder, followed by 
other dignitaries who must show allegiance to the former and then by 
subaltern categories of commoners. The status of iaramara is seen as sym-
bolizing the powers of kastom, but the iani represent the strong arm of its 
law. This three-stage rocket of neo-customary authority would henceforth 
be recurrent in much bureaucratic standardization or homogenization of 
chiefs and kastom on Tanna, adding sometimes to the “chief” status such 
curious titles as “paramount,” “king,” or “big king” (figures 5 and 6). 
Moreover, since the chiefs’ power over kastom had been written down, no 
further contestation over the interpretation of this text would be allowed. 
The Tannese have several languages, but the history of the island “from 
time before until today was that we the people of Tanna have ONE KAS-
TOM LAW” (D’Arcy 1994, 5).
The “Niko Letan Kanstituson” of 2006 is an essential addition to the 
1985 “Tanna Kastom Law.” Both kastom codices are quite different in 
their overall purpose and the second, written twenty-one years after the 
first, arose in a different political context. But once more, a privileged 
position is given to the iani. This constitution represents complete corona-
tion for them: “God bless the yeni” (article 6). It proclaims that yeni are 
the highest kastom rulers: “The yeni is the paramount chief chosen by a 
tribe according to his chiefly blood line” (article 20). Each tribe must have 
a yeni, and his authority is guaranteed lifelong (articles 21, 22). The presi-
dent or head of the Nikoletan council, “after having been chosen by the 
means of kastom, culture and traditional beliefs, becomes the Paramount 
Chief of the island” (article 25). Maintaining the hegemony of yeni chiefs 
also supposes getting rid of all confusion about the alleged customary 
origin of their privileges, in order to neutralize possible attempts to usurp 
their power. Several articles are devoted to this work of clarification:
Criteria to be a yeni. Art.26 The yeni has always been, he was there before 
anyone. Art.27. The yeni is appointed in accordance with his bloodline. Art.28 
Yeni is a special kastom name for a tribe. Art.29 The yeni is not: a tupunis; 
a yeramara; the political commissar of a political party; an elected councilor 
of a local authority (Provincial Gvt, Municipal, etc.); a Parlement Member; a 
Pastor, a Father except if they follow the line of the yeni. (Niko Letan 2006) 
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The only other codification work in the constitution is devoted to the way 
yeni representatives are designated at different tribal-area levels and how 
they are encompassed at the island level. Otherwise, this Nikoletan con-
stitution is resolutely modernist and bureaucratic. It takes a very juridi-
cal turn, referring to “supreme law” and “supreme bodies” and claiming 
a copyright on anything that has a “kastom symbolic meaning.” Several 
chapters are devoted to procedural rules, executive organization, and sec-
retary or treasurer appointments. Special emphasis is laid on the different 
levels (state, island, area) of sovereignty. This latter aspect was stressed 
by the chairman of the Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs, Chief 
Paul Tahi, when he came to Port Vila to launch the first constitution of the 
Nikoletan Council of Chiefs on Tanna in May 2006: 
In his official address in front of more than 3,000 men, women and children 
who witnessed the ceremony, Chief Tahi said . . . the Malvatumauri National 
Council of Chiefs recognizes the Nikoletan Constitution and the Malvatumauri 
will make sure that the Government recognize the constitution promoted by 
the custom chiefs of Tanna . . . the “bubu loa” [ancestral law] of Tanna. . . .
Figure 5 Diagram of a standardized vision of the structure of authority in 
Tanna, at a workshop on kastom governance in Lenakel, Tanna, July 2011. 
© Marc Tabani.
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He called on the people of Tanna to treat at all times the Nikoletan Constitu-
tion as the rightful custom laws that govern the twelve nakamal of Tanna and 
also remember that Vanuatu’s Constitution is the “mama loa” [Mama Law]. 
(Vanuatu Daily Post, 16 May 2006) 
Tannese kastom and the “Twelve Nakamal” Organization
This emphasis on the institutional legitimation of the Nikoletan by the 
Malvatumauri, almost three decades after the consecutive creation of these 
two councils of chiefs, may appear surprising. The attempt to depoliticize 
chiefs—making them dependent on state power according to the govern-
ment’s will to consider that kastom should transcend the infra-national 
divisions inherited from colonization—seemed to have been long over. 
Despite the claimed anteriority of ancestral law (bubu loa) over the Con-
stitution (mama loa) of the Republic of Vanuatu, the latter stipulates that 
it is up to the state to validate local variations of kastom and not the oppo-
Chiefly Structure on Tanna 
(According to senior Tannese source) 
laramara 
(Paramount Chief/Big King} 
I 
lani 
(King of the tribes, Chief's spokesman} 
Tipunis 
(Hold stones in charge of weather} 
I 
Numaninatik 
(Group of People} 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Manamana 
(Group of People} 
I 
Nias (Family Groups} 
Figure 6 Standardized diagram of 
“chiefly structure on Tanna.” © Nixon, 
Leisande, and Raewyn 2012, 12; repro-
duced with permission. 
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site. Less familiar to a reader of the Vanuatu Daily Post not from Tanna 
is the reminder of state sovereignty and the prominence of the Nikoletan 
over the Twelve Nakamal (tn). On Tanna, there are hundreds of naka-
mal (imwarem in Kwamara language, iimwaiimw in Lenakel language), 
places set aside for kava ceremonies and the organization of traditional 
dances. The twelve concerned here refer to those supposed to be entitled 
to host the great nakwiari ceremony—a selection that is not traditionally 
unanimously approved. But in more concrete terms, the expression refers 
to an organization of the same name, which also possesses a constitution, 
dating from the 27 June 2006 and signed by the twelve “chiefs” (iani) of 
these nakamal.
Behind the matter of this “tn” organization, we find vague opportunis-
tic desires to exploit Tanna’s kastom for political purposes internal to the 
island, coupled with political and commercial aims inspired by external 
national and international covetousness. It began with the collusion of 
interests of a New Caledonian photographer and French diplomatic net-
works. The former, it seems, wanted to make it easier for himself to attend 
a nakwiari ceremony, which is organized according to a complex calendar, 
sometimes every year and sometimes with a break of several years. He 
hoped to curry favor with President Jacques Chirac by approaching the 
francophile tribes most able to give the president, for the inauguration of 
his Quai Branly Museum, the “ambassador objects” worthy of being part 
of the “dialogue of cultures” vaunted by this establishment. The French 
Embassy in Port Vila and the High Commission of New Caledonia were 
contacted. Old local mythologies about the French ship Kersaint coming 
in 1912 to “save the custom of Tanna” from the Presbyterian missionaries 
were recalled. “This story (of the Kersaint) has remained in the collective 
memory of the inhabitants of Tanna, who since then have felt they owe a 
debt to France,” explained Pierre Mayaudon, the French ambassador to 
Vanuatu (Agence France-Presse, 3 June 2006).
So, in thanks, a chief from the east of the island was willing to give a 
kwerrya to France. This feathered ritual pole about three meters high, 
made of an armature of coconut palm ribs, covered in multicolored chicken 
feathers and topped with sparrow hawk (kwerrya) feathers, is considered 
to be the symbol of the nakwiari masters (iermenu) (see figure 2). On the 
Tannese side, the kwerrya affair would soon snowball. Under the manage-
ment of several directors of government services in the capital and leaders 
of pro-French political parties (National Community Association, Green 
Party), a number of local dignitaries were approached. The choice fell on 
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Chief Yaukalepwi (also sometimes spelled Iaukalpi), one of the two iani 
of Yanamwakel in the White Sands region, in the east of the island. Both 
dignitaries are traditionally the guardians of two long stones whose shape 
was similar to that of Polynesian adzes: “The largest stone, the ‘elder’ one, 
was called Numrukwen, the other Koyometa. . . . The island’s existence 
still seems quite generally to be considered partly determined by the pres-
ervation of these stones whose loss would represent a kind of national 
catastrophe” (Guiart 1956, 66). These mythological stones go back to 
the dualistic system that structured social and spatial organization and 
was destroyed in the nineteenth century at the end of the wars between 
moieties affiliated under these names. However, the Yanamwakel nakamal 
has not been considered suitable for the organization of a nakwiari for 
decades. But beyond the non-customary dance place that was used for the 
August 2005 ceremony, it was the legitimacy of this entire nakwiari that 
was challenged by many of the island’s customary dignitaries. This great 
ceremony of peace would throw Tanna into discord. Two kwerrya were 
specially prepared there as gifts to foreign countries: one for France and a 
second one for China (the latter was in the end never exported, as it was 
blocked in the island by Tannese opponents).
This gesture acquired its full significance as the whole undertaking 
became more and more excessive: a French Navy ship, the Jacques Cartier, 
was given the mission of fetching the kwerrya from the village of Yanam-
wakel at the beginning of November 2005. On this occasion, officers and 
sailors disembarked to take part in a second gifting ceremony that bore 
little resemblance to custom. A camera crew came specially from France to 
make a film about the event as well as to publish a book about it (Ghezel-
bash 2006; Darmayan and Ghezelbash 2006). Finally, in June 2006, Chief 
Yaukalepwi himself was invited to the inauguration of the Quai Branly 
Museum in order to present, in person and wearing traditional dress, the 
feathered pole he had entrusted to the museum, to Jacques Chirac, and 
to then United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan (figure 7). On his 
return, he spread rumors in the bush about the independence for Tanna he 
claimed to have negotiated with these two personalities, thanks to his gift. 
This theme, common in Tanna, of a recolonization of the island by France 
and its incorporation into New Caledonia, met with even more approval 
than usual among the large local francophone population.
The whole business surrounding the “Tanna feather” put the governing 
authorities in a very awkward position. They gave the Nikoletan the task 
of sorting out this affair. The situation seemed to resemble that occasioned 
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two years earlier, when a deputy from the Vanuatu Green Party, Moana 
Carcasses, went to Tahiti to take advantage of President Chirac’s visit 
there in order to present Chirac with honorary customary Vanuatu titles, 
including that of “tapunga” of Tanna. On this occasion, the Nikoletan 
expressed itself in extremely crude terms by declaring to the press that the 
name “tapunga was not a prostitute!”:
The Island Council of Tanna Chiefs, Nikoletan, has voiced its concern over the 
bestowal of the traditional name “tapunga” to the French President Jacques 
Chirac, by a group of local politicians. In a letter of concern written to the Min-
istry of Internal Affairs, the chairman of the Niko Le Ten Council of Chiefs, 
Chief Pita Nimaulul, brought to the minister’s attention that no approval had 
been given by his chiefs for the use of the name. . . . “This matter has not been 
approved and in relation to our custom and its function, such a party and its 
mps, which have abused the custom, should be punished according to our cus-
tom laws,” emphasized Chief Nimaulul. He stated that according to custom, 
“tapunga” is not a name given to any ordinary person, but specially for the 
purpose of rebuilding the relationship between iani and iaramara, whenever 
one has done something wrong to the other. (Port Vila Presse, 23 Sept 2003)5
Figure 7 Chief Yaukalepwi and his nephew Jerry Napat giving a kwerrya to 
French President Jacques Chirac at the Musée du Quai Branly, Paris, 20 June 
2006. © Gamma-Rapho; reproduced with permission. 
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But this time it emerged that the gift of the kwerrya to France appeared to 
be the tip of the iceberg and was actually part of a much broader and more 
premeditated program. Rather than run the risk of being attacked by the 
Nikoletan, it was thought better to challenge its legitimacy and to attempt 
to replace it with a new customary council, seen as more respectful of 
traditional rules. With the help of a Tannese jurist, a loose conglomera-
tion of protagonists in Port Vila published a “Constitution of the Twelve 
Nakamal of Tanna Island.” By mobilizing local networks on the island, 
they gained the support of the “chiefs” of these twelve dance places for 
this constitution, which they personally signed on 27 January 2006. This 
was the beginning of a trial of strength with the Nikoletan, which man-
aged to produce its own new constitution several months later, in May 
2006. During the interval, the Nikoletan’s strategy for opposing the tn 
was based on challenging Chief Yaukalepwi’s customary right to give a 
 kwerrya to France and, more especially, on questioning the very existence 
of his “chiefly” status. In the days following the presentation of the feather 
to the Quai Branly Museum, Moses Nasu Kasaually, from the same vil-
lage as Yaukalepwi, expressed himself in the Vanuatu press concerning the 
kwerrya, stating that it was the equivalent of his iermenu crown and that, 
under the guise of a gift, it was in fact a question of exporting, misusing, 
and misappropriating a sacred object.
Vanuatu’s gift of a kwerrya feather to French President Jacques Chirac has 
been questioned by a Tanna man, who claims to be the rightful owner of 
the feather, Vanuatu Daily Post reports. Moses Nasu Kasaually from Yana-
mwakel village told the newspaper that he was not consulted by chief Iau-
kalpi, who made the presentation to President Chirac in Paris last month. Mr 
Kasaually described the presentation of the gift as the selling of his birthright 
to France. He said chief Iaukalpi did not have the customary right to take 
the gift to France. Mr Kasaually said the kwerrya feather was his crown and 
chief Iaukalpi has now decided to sell it off cheaply to France. (Pacnews, 18 
July 2006) 
I was able to talk with Kasaually, and during our conversations, he 
stressed the fact that Yaukalepwi was an adopted child and, in his view, 
had illegitimately received a name that enabled him to acquire the iani 
niko title. Some of the francophone groups of Tanna joined this dispute, 
insofar as the Yaukalepwi group was originally associated with the Pres-
byterian mission and that they saw in the latter’s approach a strategy 
for regaining their historic relationship with France, for whom they had 
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“given their blood.” At Kasaually’s request, this mobilization led to the 
holding of a customary meeting in late October 2006, attended by all the 
chiefs from the east of the island. In front of all the Tannese protagonists 
in this affair and several hundred witnesses, Kasaually decided to strip 
Yaukalepwi of his iani niko title. This measure—previously unheard of 
in customary terms, if we are to believe the participants—opened up the 
way for institutional proceedings conducted by the Nikoletan, which up 
until then had paradoxically kept out of this strictly customary proce-
dure. At a meeting of the Nikoletan, an official letter of protest, dated 
1 November 2006, was addressed in anglicized Bislama to the French 
ambassador in Port Vila. Below are the main extracts as they appeared 
in the letter:
Re: Kweria (Crown) of Tannese King that was taken to new Museum in France. 
Niko Letan Council of Chiefs, the last and highest traditional decision 
making body on Tanna wishes to express its disappointment over the way the 
 Kweria Crown was taken to France without proper consultation with Niko 
Letan Council of Chiefs.
Kweria is a Tannese (people of Tanna) highest Chiefly identity. That should 
not ever, ever be given away to anyone or other country without consulting 
those responsible for custom and tradition of the people of Tanna. Giving 
away Kweria Crown to foreign person or foreign country is like selling your 
birthright as far as Tannese culture is concerned. 
Kweria to France has caused divisions among the chiefs of Tanna and their 
various tribes. . . . Niko Letan suggested that, Yaukalepwi and French Ambas-
sador arrange a peace ceremony and apologies to Niko Letan Council of Chiefs 
and to the people of Tanna for such action. After the peace ceremony, Niko 
Letan will then decide if the Kweria be returned to Tanna or can be kept in 
France with certain conditions apply.
Niko Letan Council of Chiefs on behalf of Tannese communities requested 
Mr. Marc Tabani who is a French researcher to convey our dissatisfaction both 
to the France Ambassador to Vanuatu and to the French Government for such 
an irresponsible behavior. In the meantime, Niko Letan Councils of Chiefs will 
investigate Chief Yaukalepwi’s real intention behind sending Kweria to France. 
I myself handed this letter to the French ambassador, but it remained 
unanswered. No ceremony of apology was organized and the kwerrya on 
the banks of the Seine has to date not been returned. Similarly, the destitu-
tion of Yaukalepwi seems to have had no effect, insofar as the latter’s local 
and national support has remained strong. The existence of the tn is still 
a reality, even if it has become more discreet.
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A New Constitution to Make Tannese Chiefs  
Great Again
The tns’ constitution takes the form of a thirteen-page document with 
fifty-two articles, signed by the chiefs representing these dominant naka-
mal and a few witnesses, including the Tannese jurist behind the writ-
ing of it and an administrative representative of the district.6 Beneath its 
cursory and sketchy aspects, the content of this text does indeed repre-
sent a founding charter for a total reestablishment of customary powers: 
“‘Constitution’ in the present law means the Supreme Customary Law 
of Tanna” (article 49). Its objective is seditious, similar to a customary 
coup d’état founding an island sovereignty: “It is custom which becomes 
law on the island of Tanna” (article 52). Using the Constitution of Vanu-
atu’s acknowledgment of custom as a law and in accordance with the first 
Nikoletan Constitution (1981) describing the customary law of Tanna, 
the tn declared themselves, due to their anteriority, the “supreme body 
of the custom of Tanna and the Nikoletan Council of Chiefs is one of its 
branches or children. The tn has full power to control anything belong-
ing to the Tannese custom” (article 2b). Under certain conditions, some 
powers can be delegated to the Nikoletan (article 15a), but it is placed in 
a position of total subordination: “The tn has the permanent power to 
revise and amend the Nikoletan Constitution” (article 15b), to “appoint 
its executive members . . . to suspend or dismiss them” (article 12e). To 
this principle of “supremacy” is added that of “independence” (article 
2d). Even certain safeguards may appear suspect: the tn “wishes to work 
with the Vanuatu government, the provincial government and with all 
government bodies or ngos or any other body in order to promote cus-
tom” (article 12) and “agrees to work with the police or with any other 
government body to maintain peace and order in society” (article 36).
Curiously, the details of custom are never described in this constitution, 
but it is to be applied fully. It can also be noted that there is very little 
stress on the dominant role of the iani and the grounds for their domina-
tion. The essence of custom, like that of chiefs, henceforth goes without 
saying. The stated objective is explicitly to hierarchize the iani themselves: 
those of the tn are the supreme chiefs who represent the “twelve tribes 
of Tanna” (article 7c); “all the other chiefs are inferior to them” (article 
9). These supreme chiefs have the prerogative of nominating all the other 
dignitaries (article 20). They have the exclusive right to appoint the non-
hereditary chiefs (article 44). These laws aim at establishing a custom-
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ary dictatorship of the tn chiefs over those of the “little nakamal” that 
are their “kitchens” (article 20). These minor chiefs are divided into five 
hierarchized categories in which the iaramanang surprisingly occupy an 
intermediate position, behind the “tupunis” (agrarian magicians) and the 
“police” (article 20). The tns’ absolutist power is exercised over every-
thing concerning the use of land (identification of customary owners, dis-
putes over landownership, signing of leases), development projects, and 
economic investments (articles 28, 34, 39, 40). An essential point of this 
despotic power or its delegation is the control claimed by the tn chiefs 
over titles and names, over “chiefly titles” (article 28), and “in the origins 
of every man Tanna” (article 29): “in the future, the tn will keep a file on 
each chief of Tanna whether on Tanna or in Port Vila” (article 29c). This 
Orwellian vision of chiefs’ power, as envisaged by the tn, takes on almost 
totalitarian tones in an exclusive power of nomination, that is to say of a 
totally oligarchic attribution of chiefly titles, so as to reduce to nothing all 
customary claims contrary to the interests of this organization: 
Art. 46. Customary name
(a)  Without the written permission of the Twelve Nakamal or their repre-
sentative, no chief can give a customary name to an individual or insti-
tution.
(b)  All names already attributed are removed and only returned following 
the procedure mentioned above.
(c)  All customary names belong to the Twelve Nakamal.
Despite the absolute power the “supreme chiefs” of the tn attempted to 
assume with their constitution, in reality, it gave them little more author-
ity than that given by the Nikoletan to its own representatives. In fact, the 
philosophy behind each of these constitutions is very similar, since in both 
cases it is a matter of prohibiting any other kind of leader from becoming 
a kastom jif in place of the iani (whatever the legality of the organization 
to which they belong). However, the tns’ constitution is innovative on 
one key point. It proclaims the authority of the twelve chiefs over any 
form of land use on Tanna for economic purposes, whether traditional or 
modern, and seeks to legitimate and validate their claim to an exclusive 
copyright on the customary names and titles of all Tannese men. These 
“supreme chiefs” thus defined hitherto unheard-of possibilities for con-
trolling landownership, making it easier for land to be seized. In compari-
son, the Nikoletan keeps to the general principles defined by the Constitu-
tion of Vanuatu concerning “customary owners,” who according to a very 
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vague expression are “citizens of indigenous origin.” But the Nikoletan 
has never departed from the Tannese customary rule that no “chief” can 
claim possession of land. Chiefs of this island exercise power over men, 
but never over land; as the expression goes on Tanna, “Jif hemi jif blong 
man, hemi no jif blong kraon.”
At independence, the question of returning land to “customary own-
ers” was discussed on Tanna, in a purely formal fashion, as actual alien-
ation of land—that is, its exploitation or use for commercial productive 
purposes or for infrastructure needs—was very rare there. Even today, 
compared to the serious problems of land seizure experienced by the 
country’s other large islands, on Tanna there have been only a minimal 
number of long leases, which for the most part concern sites for collec-
tive or administrative structures, churches, and, in the private sector, tour-
ist facilities. The bad reputation sometimes given to the people of Tanna 
continues to discourage foreign investors’ attempts to alienate their land. 
Thus, over the past twenty years, the growing covetousness for land on 
Tanna has stirred up conflicts within the community. Whether these dis-
putes are between groups, organizations, or individuals claiming to rep-
resent them, the points on which disagreements are focused remain in 
most cases related to situations and rules predating those introduced by 
colonization. Former customary practices continue to be used for settling 
land problems on Tanna, even when the present-day stakes involved in 
these conflicts concern financial issues regarding land that nowadays has 
a market value. The aim henceforth is to adapt these rules to contempo-
rary economic needs. Chiefs should now be able to become guarantors of 
the land tenure or economic transactions decided on Tanna, even if this 
involves a strengthening of their personal power, unconnected with the 
will of the people and customary rules.
Encouraged by international agencies, the government has given prior-
ity to their determination to harmonize or even standardize land tenure 
rules on a national scale. Locally, initiatives encouraging the implemen-
tation of this are mostly the work of the new generations of educated 
Islanders with positions of responsibility in the public or private sector 
and access to numerous political and media relays in Vanuatu as well as 
abroad. As the latter generally possess no deep knowledge of kastom, the 
simplest means of acting locally is to exert influence on chiefs who,  ideally, 
would exercise effective power and, above all, could carry weight in eco-
nomic projects. However sincere the intentions of educated advisors may 
be, their conception of the exploitation of land and more generally their 
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economic models tend to move irremediably away from the utopian vision 
of development in the service of Melanesian custom and values believed 
in by earlier generations at the time of independence. In using kastom 
for non-customary purposes, they would seem at times to have marked 
a turning point in comparison with their elders. The power that custom 
was able to demonstrate in the past in order to prevent foreigners from 
interfering in the internal affairs of Tannese society seems to have reached 
its limits.
Conclusion: The Future of Chiefs
In Tonga, where physical stature was associated with a high social status, 
the identification of chiefs may have been easier for the inexperienced 
outside observer. As an informant pointed out in reply to an early ethnog-
rapher’s question: “Can’t you see he is a chief? See how big he is” (Gifford 
1929, 124). In Vanuatu, this identification remains extremely complex, 
even for the country’s leaders who know its cultures. According to gov-
ernment minister Ralph Regenvanu, despite the institutional role given to 
“state chiefs” and the marks of respect generally spontaneously accorded 
to any individual assimilated to a “chief,” legislating on the position of 
chiefs and their legal power is still a problem:
So, we’re stuck in a dead end—we can keep giving power to chiefs in laws, and 
yet have a position in which the laws are ineffectual because you don’t know 
who the chiefs are and anyone can step up, and then they’re contested. To 
move forward on the issues of chiefs being involved in governance we’re going 
to need to solve that problem. (Geismar and Regenvanu 2011, 42) 
Regenvanu sees the solution to this issue in the modernization of a bureau-
cratic system for recording chiefs, which would seem not to have worked 
previously because most chiefs are against it. It must be admitted that a 
consensual, democratic system for designating chiefs seems a long way 
from kastom: 
The chief is nominated. The people who have to sign are the leader of the 
churches, the leader of the women, the leader of the youth, the leader of each 
clan, and then chiefs of neighbouring villages. If they all sign: this is the chief. 
(Geismar and Regenvanu 2011, 43) 
An extraordinary paradox emerges here. What will become of the role 
and rule of customary chiefs, who would no longer be chiefs by virtue of 
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the custom they are supposed to represent? The problem therefore stems 
more from the question of kastom than from the historical status of chiefs. 
The Ni-Vanuatu often repeat as a leitmotif that many new social prob-
lems affecting rural communities are due to an erosion of custom, which 
finds expression in a loss of respect for chiefs and ignorance of the pow-
ers handed down to them by their ancestors. The weakening of kastom 
is systematically attributed to foreign cultural influences and the total-
izing economic ascendancy of money. The rampart of kastom proposed 
to counteract the generalized disruption of values would seem to have 
been submerged. But this kastom applied as a cultural corrective for the 
Ni-Vanuatu, in the form of an argument aimed at distinguishing it from 
the culture of Europeans and more generally of all foreigners, is today 
also threatened by nontraditional and non-Melanesian ways of treating 
custom. This is particularly the case for everything linked to the question 
of chiefs and the “customary” nature of their power. For what would 
become of their power outside custom?
Opinions are divided. For Regenvanu, the solution necessarily involves 
an institutional modernization of custom. He supports the paradoxical 
approach followed by the National Council of Chiefs of removing power 
from chiefs: “power has been given to the councils of chiefs, not [to] the 
chiefs” (Geismar and Regenvanu 2011, 43). Power would be held by 
the twelve island councils (plus the two urban councils of Port Vila and 
Luganville), whose only customary element would then be their name. For 
current Prime Minister Charlot Salwai, quite the reverse: the problem lies 
in the fact that chiefs have moved away from custom. On the occasion 
of the National Day of Chiefs, he declared in front of the Malvatumauri 
chiefs that “our challenge today is to maintain the status and authority of 
the chiefs around Vanuatu at the time now that external culture is increas-
ing in our society. . . . While we can regulate the functions and pass laws 
to recognize the chiefs and their roles, we must at the same time be care-
ful not to lose the fundamental custom duties and values connected with 
a chief to exercise his role and authority in customary responsibilities” 
(Vanuatu Daily Post, 10 March 2016). 
However, the supporters of both positions agree on the same conclu-
sion: custom grows weaker when the number of individuals claiming to 
be chiefs through custom is far too large. As Prime Minister Salwai stated, 
“Today, there are too many men claiming chiefly titles and I believe that 
the full process of custom practices in our respective islands must be fully 
applied so as to determine a right chief in line with the customary belief 
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that we in the Malvatumauri are aware of these challenges” (Vanuatu 
Daily Post, 10 March 2016). Rectifying the situation of chiefs in order 
to restore full value to custom is like sweeping the Augean stables. Noth-
ing seems to have fundamentally changed since the institutionalization of 
state jifs in the 1970s and the permanent temptation to create an adminis-
trative hierarchy of them. Even the development agencies are not insensi-
tive to this enduring problem and to the issues it raises in terms of stability, 
social control and obstacles to “development.” For instance, in the 2000s, 
Vanuatu received a$2.5 million from AusAID for a vast study on custom-
ary governance (Vanuatu Kastom Governance Partnership) intended to 
modernize the way it functioned. Its experts had no hesitation in interfer-
ing in the defining sanctuary of kastom and thus in meddling with a cul-
tural heritage. In AusAID’s view of the world, the populations of Vanuatu 
should rely exclusively on those “good” customary values that make it 
possible to realize that the natural and cultural heritages of Pacific Islands 
possess real resources and that an enlightened custom would not hinder 
the use of them.
The great relevance of the chiefs to development in Vanuatu means that it 
is necessary for AusAID to engage with them as development partners. . . .
Through the Partnership, AusAID is potentially supporting one particular view 
of kastom. The involvement of foreigners in anything to do with kastom is 
highly sensitive, and both acpacs [Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict 
Studies] and AusAID have had to be conscious of the perception that they are 
interfering in indigenous matters. The socially conservative nature of many 
(but not all) chiefs and the patriarchal nature of the chiefly system favored by 
Malvatumauri means that AusAID and Malvatumauri hold different values on 
certain issues, such as gender equality. (AusAID 2012, 24) 
According to these experts, “the concept of ‘kastom’ is a relatively recent 
social construct associated with the independence movement” (AusAID 
2012, 27). The deep-rooted paternalism attached to it is therefore a kind 
of modern deviance, so there is little to prevent the imagining of tradi-
tions whose very unlikely existence has nevertheless been suggested: “At 
the storian [a chat, in Bislama], the chiefs recognized the importance of 
women in the community. A woman . . . was telling chiefs that in Efate 
they should have women chiefs. Everyone went quiet. Someone was say-
ing there were women chiefs before. I think the role of women will change 
for good. I don’t know what change. I can imagine women being chief, it’s 
already happened [key informant]” (AusAID 2012, 28).
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In such contexts, it is not difficult to perceive that the problem of 
adapting custom to the most contemporary issues of postcolonial society 
or politics in Tanna or Vanuatu remains a pressing concern. In Tanna, 
noted Ron Brunton (1979), the role of chiefs with regard to social orga-
nization as it has been adapted throughout history is to guarantee the 
three aspects that characterize it: “Firstly there is an almost inflexible 
network of relations which prevents individuals or groups from creating 
or abandoning links as changing circumstances might otherwise dictate. 
Secondly, this network is all-encompassing; it does not just determine, for 
instance, the supply of a particular valuable or participation in a specific 
ritual. Thirdly, there is a system of titles which, although hierarchically 
conceived, is unable to mobilize sufficient power to constrain the auton-
omy of adult males. . . . The outcome is an atomistic society with a lot of 
structure” (Brunton 1979, 102). And it is precisely because of this atom-
ism that their kastom, all traditionalist rhetoric and modern political use 
of it aside, represents for the people of Tanna their guarantee of freedom 
and their collective independence as well as their individual autonomy. 
Traditional leaders’ powerlessness to act outside their corporate group 
without the consent of other authorities, without a chain of command, 
is the glue holding together this Tannese representation of liberty within 
and through custom.
The power of custom, recalled Sahlins (1992, 1999a), lies in its capacity 
to use modernity to its advantage. To this end, the kastom of Tanna makes 
it possible to distinguish two types of big men. Lindstrom thus identified 
among the island’s traditional leaders those whose vocation is to assume 
a role of “local big man,” whose authority stems from the composition 
of their corporate group, and those who show a natural ability to become 
“ideological big men,” who are open to new possibilities and whose role 
it is to federate people beyond their local group (Lindstrom 1981). The 
latter’s mobilizing action was above all embodied by big jifs during the 
missionaries’ intransigent reign to enable them to gain new powers. It 
was later used by the leaders of the John Frum movement in an attempt 
to misappropriate white people’s wealth, before being concentrated in the 
hands of the Nikoletan or tn chiefs to usher in development. Some of 
the alliances thus made in order to take control of destiny may have fol-
lowed paths that were tortuous, sometimes worrying in the eyes of outside 
observers, but the strength of Tannese big men is their capacity to imagine 
the outcome. And as illustrated by the case of Chief Yaukalepwi and his 
cooperation with France, which led him to Jacques Chirac at the Quai 
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Branly Museum, this faculty of imagination has proved just as fertile in 
recent years.
To use Sahlins’s expression (1992, 1999b), “the indigenization of 
modernity” has proved particularly inventive on Tanna during the last 
two centuries, even if the benefits, in terms of social and economic devel-
opment, have been somewhat limited. The different figures of traditional 
or bureaucratic authority that have been raised to the big man level, 
depending on the demands of the local context and global situation, have 
been an essential part of this process. However, the modernization of tra-
ditions affecting the exercise of power through the codification of kastom, 
the attribution of neo-customary titles to foreigners, or the participation 
of chiefs in land-seizure operations, is proving to be an increasingly risky 
undertaking. It offers more and more possibilities for external bureau-
cratic and economic pressures to interfere in the internal affairs of Tannese 
society, to influence the way kastom may be reformed in the future. The 
threat in this is that the people of Tanna may be deprived of the right to 
manipulate their kastom themselves, may be prevented from following 
their own conception of a “develop-man” process, and may be thwarted 
from continuing their efforts to domesticate modernity for their own cul-
tural benefit.
Notes
1 This point in Sahlins 1992 stands in some significant contrast to his earlier 
work (Sahlins 1963), which suggested the durability or stability of the concepts 
“chief” and “big man” for comparative anthropological purposes.
2 Article 7a of the Malvatumauri constitution is a perfect mix of ethnological 
records, except for the dubious insistence on words like “legitimate” or “true”: 
“Registration of chiefs. Sec.1: Legitimate chiefs must be of the line or blood of 
chiefs. Sec.2: A true chief must be recognized according to custom and there must 
be an installation ceremony. Sec.3: A chief must be publicly installed in a true 
custom ceremony in which pigs are killed and kava exchange” (Lindstrom and 
White 1994, 234).
3 Orthographies used in Tanna’s several languages are not standardized. 
Iermenu or ierumanu (Kwamera or South language) is also spelled iaramara or 
yeramara (Lenakel or West language) or iaramanang (Narak or Whitesands lan-
guage); iani niko or yeni niko (Lenakel) is also spelled iani entete or ieni neteta 
(Kwamera).
4 Nakwiari (Kwamera) is also spelled nikouiar (Lenakel).
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5 What is surprising on the part of all those who expressed opinions on this 
matter of the Tannese customary name given to President Chirac is that they men-
tion “tapunga” as a name or title. Tapunga, sometimes wrongly called “chiefs’ 
kava,” is a special root of Piper methysticum, grown aboveground in order to 
make its roots longer. It is decorated and used ritually during various ceremonies, 
generally as an honorific token between allied groups or as a reconciliatory gift.
6 Article 2 of the Twelve Nakamals’ constitution states: “The real great naka-
mal of Tanna are: Ienamakel; Lahtapu; Enaprapen; Lounatimi; Iwel; Lamtehkal; 
Enauia; Ekukak; Envitana; Imarsa; Enmarae; Eneiae.”
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Abstract
Nearly twenty years after the publication of Chiefs Today: Traditional Pacific 
Leadership and the Colonial State, edited by Lamont Lindstrom and Geoffrey 
White (1997), this article extends and updates coverage of earlier discussions 
concerning local and national codifications of authority in the Pacific region and 
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the relation of contemporary “chiefs” and other leaders with state bureaucra-
cies. I address this topic through an analysis of the challenges faced in Vanuatu, 
since independence, by the attempt to design bureaucratic structures that build on 
indigenous systems of authority. Looking at the historical and contemporary situ-
ation of the Tannese society in the south of the archipelago, I observe the political 
history and transformation of chiefly status on Tanna, and how local actors in 
this island have manipulated leadership possibilities (and other aspects of local 
kastom), partly by drawing on outside resources and connections. This case study 
also connects with other issues including the ongoing transformation of the roles 
of local political leaders, global connections linking small Pacific Islands with 
metropolitan actors, and disputes over cultural property and cultural appropria-
tion.
keywords: chiefs, kastom titles, local councils, state structures, Tanna island, 
Vanuatu
